Black-box risk scoring models permeate our lives, yet are typically proprietary or opaque. We propose Distill-and-Compare, an approach to audit such models without probing the black-box model API or pre-defining features to audit. To gain insight into black-box models, we treat them as teachers, training transparent student models to mimic the risk scores assigned by the black-box models.
INTRODUCTION
Risk scoring models have a long history of usage in criminal justice, finance, hiring, and other critical domains [13, 29] . They are designed to predict a future outcome, for example defaulting on a loan. Worryingly, risk scoring models are increasingly used for high-stakes decisions, yet are typically proprietary or opaque.
Several approaches have been proposed [1, 2, 14, 18, 21, 36] to audit black-box risk scoring models: remove, permute, or obscure a protected feature, then see how the the model's predictions change Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than the author(s) must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from permissions@acm.org. AIES '18, February 2-3, 2018, New Orleans, LA, USA © 2018 Copyright held by the owner/author(s). Publication rights licensed to ACM. ACM ISBN 978-1-4503-6012-8/18/02. . . $15.00 https://doi.org/10.1145/3278721.3278725 after retraining the model or probing the model API with the transformed data. However, creators of proprietary risk scoring models often do not provide unrestricted access to model APIs, much less release the model form or training data. Moreover, approaches that focus on one or two protected features defined in advance are less likely to detect biases that are not a priori known.
In this paper, we study a more realistic setting where we only have a data set labeled with the risk score (as produced by the risk scoring model), the ground-truth outcome, and some or all features; we are not able to probe the model API with new data. We call this data set the audit data. We add two potential complications: the audit data may not be the original training data, and the audit data may not have all features used to train the risk scoring model. For example, ProPublica obtained data for their COMPAS study [5] not from the company that created COMPAS, but through a public records request to Broward County (BC), a US jurisdiction that used COMPAS in their criminal justice system [4] . ProPublica may not have had access to all the features BC used for COMPAS.
We propose Distill-and-Compare, an approach to audit black-box risk scoring models using audit data with both black-box risk scores and ground-truth outcomes, without pre-defining feature regions to audit. First, we train a model on the audit data to mimic the black-box model. Then we train another model to predict outcomes (Section 2.1). To gain insight into the black-box model, we uncover feature regions where the two models are significantly different (Section 2.3), and ask "what could be happening in the black-box model, that could explain the differences we are seeing between the mimic and outcome models?". Finally, we use a statistical test (Section 2.2) to determine if the black-box model used additional features we do not have access to (i.e. features not in the audit data).
The contributions of this paper are: 1) We propose an approach to audit black-box risk scoring models under realistic conditions. 2) We show the importance of calibrating risk scores to remove audit data shift or scale post-processing that may been introduced by creators of risk scoring models. 3) We propose a statistical test to determine if the audit data is missing key features used to train the black-box model. 4) We apply the approach to audit four risk scoring models. 5) An ancillary contribution of this paper is a new confidence interval estimate for iGAM [10, 27, 28] , a type of transparent model.
AUDIT APPROACH
Our goal is to gain insight into a black-box risk scoring model. We draw from model distillation and comparison technique to develop our approach. Section 2.1.1 discusses related work.
Distill and Compare
Model distillation was first introduced to transfer knowledge from a large, complex model (teacher) to a faster, simpler model (student)
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AIES'18, February 2-3, 2018, New Orleans, LA, USA [7, 9, 22] . This was done by running unlabeled samples (either new unlabeled data or training data with labels discarded) through the teacher model to obtain the teacher's outputs, then training the student model to mimic the teacher's outputs. We draw parallels to our setting, taking the risk scoring model to be the teacher and the audit data to be unlabeled samples ran through the teacher (risk scoring model) to obtain the teacher's output (risk scores). We train the mimic model to minimize mean squared error between the teacher and student, i.e.,
where x t is the t-th sample in the audit data, S(x t ) is the output of the teacher model (risk scores) for sample x t ,Ŝ(x t ) is the output of the mimic model for sample x t , and T is the number of samples. Throughout this paper, we will call the teacher model the black-box model and the student model the mimic model. Next, we leverage the ground-truth outcome information. We train our own risk scoring model on the audit data to predict the ground-truth outcome, i.e.,
where O(x t ) ∈ {0, 1} is the ground-truth outcome for sample x t and O(x t ) ∈ {0, 1} is the output of the model for sample x t . Throughout this paper, we call this model the outcome model. Note that the outcome model is not a mimic model. It is critical that both the mimic model and outcome model are trained using the same model class that allows for interpretation and comparison. Not all model classes have the property that two models of that class can be compared. For example, it is not obvious how to compare two decision trees, random forests or neural nets. We want a model class that is as rich and complex as possible so that the mimic model can be faithful to the black-box model and the outcome model can accurately predict ground-truth outcomes. However, this model class should still be transparent [17] so that we can examine its predictions across different feature regions. In this paper, we use a particular transparent model class, iGAM (Section 2.3.1); other choices are possible.
The risk score and the ground-truth outcome are closely relatedthe ground-truth outcome is what the black-box risk scoring model was meant to predict. If the black-box model is accurate and generalizes to the audit data, it would predict the ground-truth outcomes in the audit data correctly; the converse is true if the black-box model is not accurate or does not generalize to the audit data.
Because both the mimic and outcome models are trained with the same model class on the same audit data using the same features, the more faithful the mimic model, and the more accurate the outcome model, the more likely it is that observed differences between the mimic and outcome models stem from differences between the black-box model and ground-truth outcomes. This allows us to ask, "what could be happening in the black-box model, that could explain the differences we are seeing between the mimic and outcome models?". In addition, similarities between the mimic and outcome models (e.g., on COMPAS in Section 3.2, the Number of Priors feature is modeled very similarly by the two models) increases confidence that the mimic model is a faithful representation of the black-box model, and that any differences observed on other features are meaningful.
2.1.1 Related Work. Several auditing approaches also use model distillation techniques to distill black-box models when they cannot be queried or to understand them [1, 2] . Other approaches also train their own outcome models, then uncover feature regions where the model is not accurate [3, 23, 24, 38] . Kim et al. 's iterative procedure [24] not only uncovers such regions but also modifies the model to improve accuracy in these regions. However, they require repeated calls to the model; Agarwal et al. [3] and Kearns et al. [23] similarly require repeated calls or knowledge of the model. Tramer et al. uncovered unexplained associations between black-box outputs and protected features on audit data [35] .
Our approach is different from the above, as we avoid repeated calls to the black-box model API (that may not realistically be available), and instead utilize information on both risk scores and outcomes already available in some data sets in this domain (e.g. ProPublica COMPAS data). Some other approaches also compare two models, but not risk scores and outcomes at the same time. Wang et al. trained a model to predict outcomes and another to predict membership in a protected feature region [37] . Chouldechova and G'Sell trained two different outcome models then identified feature regions where the two models differed [12] .
Testing for Missing Features
If the audit data is missing features used by the black-box model, the audit data alone may be insufficient to audit the black-box model. We propose a statistical test to check the likelihood of the audit data missing important features based on the following observation:
If the black-box model used features that are missing from the audit data but are useful for predicting the ground-truth outcome, the error between the mimic model (learned on the audit data) and the risk score, ||Ŝ − S || E , should be positively correlated with the error between the outcome model (learned on the audit data) and ground-truth outcome, ||Ô − O || E . where E is an error metric. Since the test uses predictions from both the mimic and outcome models, the test is performed after both models are trained. In Section 3.4, we perform the test on all risk scoring models we audit in this paper, to check if the audit results are significantly affected by missing features. Note that this test does not require the mimic and outcome models to be transparent.
Comparing Mimic and Outcome Models
In this section, we provide technical details on how to train the mimic and outcome models so that they are comparable.
Choice of model class.
As noted in Section 2.1, we train the mimic model and outcome model using the same transparent model class-in this paper, iGAM [10, 27, 28] . We point the reader to [10, 27, 28] to learn more about iGAMs and to [34] for a distillation example where it was used as a student. Briefly, iGAM has the form
where д is the logistic function for classification and identity function for regression, h 0 is the intercept, and the contribution of any one feature x i or pair of features x i and x j to the prediction can be visualized in graphs such as Figure 2 (with h i (x i ) on the y-axis) and Figure 5 (with regions colored by h i j (x i , x j )). For classical GAMs [20] , h(·) are fitted using splines; for iGAM, they are fitted using ensembles of shallow trees and centered for identifiability. Crucially, since iGAM is an additive model, two iGAM models can be compared by simply taking a difference of their feature contributions h(·), which we exploit in Section 2.3.3 to detect differences between the mimic and outcome models.
Calibrating model inputs.
Calibration is the process of matching predicted and empirical probabilities [15, 31] . If a risk score is well-calibrated, the relationship between the risk score and empirical probabilities will be linear (e.g., COMPAS and Stop-and-Frisk in the top row of Figure 6 in the Appendix). While developing the method, we discovered that not all risk scores exhibit the desired linear relationship with outcomes in the audit data. For example, the Chicago Police risk score (third column of Figure 6 in the Appendix) is rather flat for risk scores less than 350, then exhibits a sharp kink upwards. One possible explanation for any nonlinear relationship is that the risk score was well-calibrated on its original training data, but the audit data has a different distribution (data shift) [32] . Another possible explanation is post-processing by model creators to reduce sensitivity in less important parts of the risk score scale and enhance separation in more important parts of the scale [26] .
We make the reasonable assumption that risk scores should be monotonic and well-calibrated [26] and use this assumption to undo scale post-processing or audit data shift before training the mimic and outcome models. Specifically, we learn a nonlinear transformation of the risk score (the blue line in Figure 6 in the Appendix), similar to isotonic regression [31] , to make the risk scores and outcomes linearly related on a scale of choice. The mimic model is then trained with the transformed risk scores as labels; the outcome model is trained with outcomes, unchanged.
This pre-training calibration step is necessary to compare the mimic and outcome models, as it makes their labels linearly related on a scale that their predicted labels will later be compared on. We select this scale to be logit probability (since the predicted outcomes are already on this scale), and perform this calibration step for Chicago Police and Lending Club but not COMPAS and Stop-and-Frisk, since the latter two already exhibit the desired linear relationships. See Appendix B for details.
Detecting differences.
To not mistake random noise for real differences between the mimic and outcome models, we control potential sources of noise during the training process. To avoid data sample-specific effects, we train the mimic and outcome models on the same data sample. Let sh i (x i ) be feature x i 's contribution to the mimic model, and similarly oh i (x i ) for the outcome model. We calculate the difference in feature x i 's contribution to the two models, sh i (x i ) − oh i (x i ), and construct a confidence interval for this difference to tell if it is statistically significant. One ancillary contribution of this paper is a new method to estimate confidence intervals for the iGAM model class, by employing a bootstrap-of-little-bags approach [33] to estimate the variance of h i (x i ) and sh i ( 
RESULTS

Validating the Audit Approach
In this section, we demonstrate Distill-and-Compare on risk scoring models where we have some information on how they were trained, and check that the approach can recover this information. model for weapon possession:
Stop
where S is the risk score, PS denotes primary stop circumstance being presence of suspicious object, AS denotes secondary stop circumstance being sight of criminal activity, and Bulдe denotes bulge in clothing [19] . Since we know the risk scoring model's functional form, we can verify that the mimic model correctly recovers these coefficients. We apply the risk scoring model to label 2012 data (T =126,457, p=40) after following Goel et al. 's data pre-processing steps [19] .
Result. The mimic model recovers the coefficients (3, 1, 1) for the three features used in the risk scoring model (PS, AS, Bulдe) and 0 for the remaining features. Figure 2 shows the feature contributions of the mimic model (in red) and outcome model (in green) for the 8 features the Chicago Police says were used by the black-box model; Figure 3 shows the 8 features the Chicago Police says were not used in their model. Figure  2 , but does not assign any importance to the features in Figure 3 . This agrees with Chicago Police's statement about which features were and were not used in the black-box model. We also note that the outcome model (in green) does assign importance to the unused features (Figure 3 ), suggesting that there is signal available in the 8 unused features that the Chicago Police risk scoring model could have used, but chose not to use. Race and sex are 2 of these 8 features, which the Chicago Police especially emphasized are not used. These experiments show that mimic models can provide insights into black-box models, and demonstrate the advantages of using outcome information.
Result. There is a striking difference between Figures 2 and 3: the mimic model (in red) assigns importance to the features in
Auditing COMPAS
COMPAS, a proprietary score developed to predict recidivism risk, has been the subject of scrutiny for racial bias [5, 8, 11, 13, 16, 25 ]. We do not know what model class, input features or data were used to train COMPAS. As described in Section 1, the COMPAS audit data 3 was collected by ProPublica; it is likely different from the original COMPAS training data. Figure 4 compares the COMPAS mimic model (in red) and outcome model (in green) for four features: Age, Race, Number of Priors, and Gender. The dotted lines are 95% pointwise confidence intervals. We observe the following:
COMPAS agrees with ground-truth outcomes regarding the number of priors. In the 3rd plot in Figure 4 , the mimic model and outcome model agree on the impact of Number of Priors on risk; their confidence intervals overlap through most of its range.
COMPAS disagrees with ground-truth outcomes for some age and race groups. The 1st and 2nd plots in Figure 4 show the effect of Age and Race on the mimic and outcome models. The mimic model (red) and the outcome model (green) are very similar between ages 20 to 70, and their confidence intervals overlap. For ages greater than 70, there is evidence that the models disagree as the confidence intervals do not overlap.
The mimic and outcome models are also different for ages 18 and 19: the mimic model predicts low risk for young individuals, but we see no evidence to support this in the outcome model, with risk appearing to be highest for young individuals.
The mimic model predicts that African Americans are even higher risk, and Caucasians lower risk, than the ground-truth outcomes suggest is warranted. Note that the ground-truth outcomes might themselves be biased due to historical discrimination against African Americans.
Gender has opposite effects on COMPAS compared to groundtruth outcome. In the 4th plot in Figure 4 , we see a discrepancy between the mimic model and outcome model on Gender. The mimic model predicts higher risk than warranted by ground-truth outcomes for females, and conversely for males.
Using differences to gain insight into COMPAS. We now ask "what could be happening in COMPAS, that could explain the differences we are seeing between the mimic and outcome models?":
(1) Some feature regions may be underrepresented in the blackbox model's training data and/or the audit data. In this audit data, only 3% of samples are between 18 and 20 years old, only 0.5% are older than 70 years old, and only 19% are female, which makes learning accurate models in these regions harder.
Home Ownership Status
Year Loan Issued Year Loan Issued (2) The black-box model may be deliberately simple for some feature regions. For ages greater than 70, the outcome model has much wider confidence intervals than the mimic model. We investigate this in Section 3.4. While we cannot tell (without further investigation) the definitive reason that explains a particular difference between the mimic and outcome models, this has surfaced ideas about the black-box model and uncovered potentially problematic feature regions that we did not a priori know, but can now proceed to investigate further.
Auditing Lending Club
Lending Club, an online peer-to-peer lending company, rates loans it finances on an A1-G5 scale. We use a subset of five years (2007-2011) of loans 4 that have matured, so that we have ground-truth on whether the loan defaulted. We do not know what model class or input features Lending Club used to train their risk scoring model. We believe the data sample we have is similar to the data they would have used to train their models. According to Lending Club, their models are refreshed periodically.
We use this Lending Club example to discuss an insight gained into the black-box model from inspecting feature interactions in the transparent models. Figure 5 shows the interaction of loan issue year 4 https://www.lendingclub.com/info/download-data.action Note the difference in ranges between the two plots-the range goes up to 0.2 for the outcome model (in green) whereas the range is much lower for the mimic model (in red). One possible explanation for this difference is that the Lending Club risk scoring model is updated conservatively (with some lag time), instead of being rapidly updated as economic conditions and behavior change.
Which Audit Data Are Missing Features?
As black-box models may use additional features we do not have access to, we developed a test (Section 2.2) to assess the impact missing features could have on the audit. Table 1 provides 95% confidence intervals for three correlation measures (linear and nonlinear) used in the test. If zero is in the confidence interval, the error of the mimic model (trained on the audit data) is not correlated with the error of the outcome model (also trained on the audit data). Then, it is unlikely that the audit data is missing key feature(s) that are a) predictive of outcomes (and hence will negatively affect the error of the outcome model if missing); and b) used in the black-box model (and hence will negatively affect the error of the mimic model if missing).
In Lending Club and Stop-and-Frisk we cannot distinguish these correlations from zero, suggesting that no key features are missing from the audit data. For Chicago Police, the confidence intervals contain 0 or are very close to 0 (lower limit 0.01), hence there is little evidence of missing key features. For COMPAS, there is evidence of positive correlation, indicating that the ProPublica data may be missing key features used in the COMPAS model. This is supported by the findings in Section 3.5 that no mimic models trained on the ProPublica data, however powerful (e.g., random forests), could mimic COMPAS well.
Fidelity and Accuracy
To quantitatively evaluate the audit approach, we report fidelity (how well the mimic model predicts the black-box model's risk scores, measured in RMSE) and accuracy (how well the outcome model predicts the ground-truth outcomes, measured in AUC) for all the risk scoring models we audit in Table 2 . For comparison, we also train linear models (a simpler model class than iGAM) and random forests (more complex, but less interpretable).
For COMPAS, all model classes (linear model, iGAM, random forest) have roughly equal fidelity and accuracy. Interestingly, none obtained RMSE lower than 2 on a 1-10 scale. Comparing outcome 
Using Additional Data for Distillation
One possible reason why COMPAS is challenging to mimic may be that the ProPublica data is missing key features. This agrees with the results of the statistical test in Section 3.4. Another possible reason is the small sample size (less than 7,000 samples). One advantage of using a model distillation approach to inspect black-box models is that the approach may be able to benefit from additional unlabeled data if the black-box model can be queried to label the additional data [9] . We found an additional 3,000 individuals in the ProPublica data with COMPAS risk scores but no ground-truth outcomes. Adding them to the training (not testing) data for the mimic model and retraining the mimic model, we find marginal improvement in the mimic model's fidelity (from RMSE 2.0 to 1.98). Doing the opposite-removing individuals from the training data in 1,000 increments-decreased the mimic model's fidelity only marginally (to RMSE 2.1, training on only 1,000 individuals). These analyses suggest that for COMPAS, missing key features is a more pressing issue than insufficient data.
DISCUSSION
Sometimes we are interested in detecting bias on features intentionally excluded from the black-box model. For example, a credit risk scoring model is probably not allowed to use race as an input. Unfortunately, not using race does not prevent the model from learning to be biased. Racial bias in a data set is likely to be in the outcomes -the labels used for learning; not using race as an input feature does not remove the bias from the labels.
If race were uncorrelated with all other features (and combinations of features) provided to the model, then removing race would prevent the model from learning to be racially biased because it would not have any input features on which to model this bias. Unfortunately, in any real-world, high-dimensional data set, there is massive correlation among the features, and a model trained to predict credit risk will learn to be biased from correlation of the excluded race feature with other features that likely remain in the model (e.g., income or education).
Hence, removing a protected feature like race or gender does not prevent a model from learning to be biased. Instead, removing protected features make it harder to detect how the model is biased, or correct the bias, because the bias is now spread in a complex way among all the correlated features throughout the model instead of being localized to the protected features. The main benefit of excluding protected features like race or gender from the inputs of a machine learning model is that it allows the group deploying the model to claim (incorrectly) that their model is not biased because it did not use these features.
When training a transparent model to mimic a black-box model, we intentionally include all features-even protected features like race and gender-specifically because we are interested in seeing what the mimic model could learn from them. If, when the mimic model mimics the black-box model, it does not see any signal on the race or gender features and learns to model them as flat (zero) functions, this suggests whether the black-box model did or did not use these features, but also if the black-box model exhibits race or gender bias even if race or gender were not used as inputs.
CONCLUSION
The Distill-and-Compare approach to auditing black-box models was motivated by a realistic setting where access to the black-box model API is not available. Instead, only a data set labeled with the risk score (as produced by the risk scoring model) and the groundtruth outcome is available. The efficacy of Distill-and-Compare increases when a model class that can be highly faithful to the black-box model and highly accurate at predicting the groundtruth outcomes is used, and when the audit data is not missing key features used in the black-box model.
A key advantage of using transparent models to audit black-box models is that we do not need to know in advance what to look for. Many current auditing approaches focus on one or two protected features defined in advance, and thus are less likely to detect biases that are not a priori known. The Distill-and-Compare audit approach using transparent models can hence be most useful for real-world, high-dimensional data with multiple, unknown sources of bias. In this case, the mimic model can be trained directly on the raw risk score. When the relationship is not linear (Chicago Police and Lending Club), the risk score must be calibrated (Section 2.3.2). The blue monotonic curves (middle row) are the nonlinear transformations learned during the calibration step. This transformation is applied to the raw risk score to yield the transformed risk score (see Figure 7 ).
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